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Abstract 
 
 
This paper elaborates theory inductively by following the evolution of fourteen strategic 
initiatives from an exploratory case study. The study examines the context and character of 
such initiatives over an 8-year period. Based on these initiatives, the paper proposes a two-
stage selection mechanism for the intra-evolutionary strategy process that explains the long-
term mutation of organizations. The mechanism operates by selecting according to both fit 
with the strategic intent and feasibility of the initiative. These two elements combine into an 
organizational principle that is perceived as permanent in character but mutates through 
constructive confrontation. This principle contributes to the organizational identity but, being 
a low-level element of such identity, it can be modified through learning while retaining an 
attribute of endurance as perceived by organizational members.  
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The conception of strategy making as an intra-organizational evolutionary 
phenomenon has shed light on the genesis of strategy (Bower, 1970; Burgelman, 1983a; 
2002a; Lovas and Ghoshal, 2000; Noda and Bower, 1996). Key to this evolutionary process 
was the identification of autonomous and induced behaviours as the driver behind strategic 
initiatives that are selected as part of the organization’s strategy (Bower, 1970; Burgelman, 
1983b). Nevertheless, the source and genesis of the actual selection mechanism appear only 
partly specified within Burgelman’s process model of variation, selection and retention of 
strategic initiatives. Although Burgelman (1991) noted that selection draws from culture, 
such a notion was not developed. This is surprising because the selection mechanism had a 
crucial role in driving Intel’s mutation by determining which initiatives were selected. 
Describing the source and genesis of the selection mechanism would add to our 
understanding of intra-organizational evolution. Thus, the questions that motivated this 
research are how such a selection mechanism originates and how it operates. 
This paper’s key argument is that the selection mechanism is driven by constructive 
confrontation and negotiation based on power and influence, which are not considered, to the 
best of our knowledge, in the existing literature. The argument is developed in an inductive 
fashion from the case study of Road Runner, an organization that expanded from a localized 
operation to the rest of Spain, achieving exponential growth. The paper draws upon fourteen 
strategic initiatives developed to deliver such growth. These initiatives were embedded in the 
longitudinal single case of Road Runner (Yin, 1994). The remainder of this paper is 
organized as follows. The next section will briefly describe the theoretical background. Then, 
the paper presents the methodology used to develop the inductive theory, followed by the 
data analysis and theoretical elaboration. Finally, the discussion and conclusions describe an 
intra-evolutionary theory, highlighting the contribution of this study.  A
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THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
One crucial role of strategic management is to permit adaptation, which manages the 
choice of purpose and effectively uses the firm’s material and organizational strengths while 
adjusting the purpose, the resources or both to bring them into balance (Chakravarthy, 1982). 
The strategy process enacts these functions when it links the environment with the strategy of 
the organization. Specific outcomes of the strategy process will either be routines for the 
evolutionary approach to strategy in which inertial activities are seen to dominate 
organizational activity (Cohen et al., 1996) or capabilities that are more forward looking and 
can be acquired or adapted (Teece et al., 1997). Similar to Gavetti and Rivkin (2007), who 
use the positioning and environmental schools to address the middle ground of behavioural 
plausibility, we use capabilities to understand the interplay of inertia and change, which 
typify selection and determine subsequent strategic renewal. Though we recognize that 
routinized activities can form dynamic capabilities, as stated by Zollo and Winter (2002), we 
treat them as different elements. We use routines as semi-automatic chunks of habitual 
activities that help firms deliver goods reliably and efficiently (Nelson and Winter, 1982). As 
such, they tend to be codified and difficult to change. Routines provide stability and 
reassurance and can be replicated. Capabilities are viewed as the ability to respond to 
environmental changes (Teece et al., 1997), and as such they can be acquired with relatively 
less difficulty. Dynamic capabilities are change drivers that can operate to extend, modify or 
create ordinary capabilities (Winter, 2003). Organizational renewal results when the strategy 
of the organization aligns with the environmental demands through successive convergent 
iterations towards a complementarity of stability and change (Burgelman, 1996; Floyd and 
Wooldridge, 2000; Huff et al., 1992; Nelson and Winter, 1982; Noda and Bower, 1996).  
For renewal to occur, the strategy-making process must be an organization-wide 
phenomenon (Hart, 1992) in which strategy formation is neither the exclusive responsibility A
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of top management (Floyd and Wooldridge, 1997; Wooldridge et al., 2008) nor only a 
bottom-up emergent event (Hambrick, 1981; Peteraf, 2005). It is the interaction between 
these organizational levels that explains strategy making and, ultimately, renewal (Hart, 
1992). In this paper, strategy making, both induced and autonomous, is regarded as 
intervening between the abstract notion of strategic intent and the specific managerial action 
that allows an organization to interact with its environment. Thus, strategy making is not 
restricted to planning and analysis but viewed as the wider organizational phenomena through 
which strategy is formed (Burgelman, 1983a).  
In the case of Intel, though its official strategy discourse was to increase production of 
DRAM memory products, when facing production capacity restrictions it applied the “rule of 
maximizing margin per-wafer-start” as the selection mechanism (Burgelman, 2002a, p. 65) . 
This rule, only acknowledged after the fact as a selection mechanism, always favoured the 
production of microprocessors over memory products, which de facto changed Intel’s 
strategy and eventually its core business. Though the selection mechanism had a crucial 
effect on the final strategy, its genesis has not been explained in relation to the induced or 
autonomous drivers in Burgelman’s process model. The rule was a simple heuristic that, ex 
post, had a major strategic consequence, although this was not recognized as such ex ante. 
Burgelman (1991) describes the selection mechanism as related to culture, yet it appears to be 
exogenous to the model, and its origin is somewhat obscure. This paper attempts to re-
examine the issue.  
Understanding the origin of such a selection mechanism is important because it would 
help explain adaptation of the organization through the selected strategies. The theory of 
intra-organizational evolution is different from that of natural evolution. In contrast to the 
constituents of natural organisms, organizational members may accept or reject a new 
initiative; hence, what explains the selection of such strategy is at the core of intra-A
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evolutionary approaches to strategy. Moreover, understanding the genesis of this selection 
mechanism can contribute to an understanding of how organizations learn. Understanding 
selection of strategic initiatives can shed light on how managers “choose to create domains of 
undiscussable issues, which inhibit learning, compared to domains where constructive 
confrontation is open, facilitating learning” (Argyris, 2006, p. 41) .  
By using an inductive approach, this paper elaborates the theory of how and why, via 
constructive confrontation, strategic initiatives are selected into organizational strategy and 
selected against when learning is inhibited. In so doing, this paper explores the paradox of 
stability and change whereby stability is necessary for initiatives to be selected, but learning 
is needed for change to occur. It contributes to the body of knowledge on strategy making by 
investigating the dynamics of selection and the integration of learning as a feature of 
selection. 
Effective use of power and influence is perhaps the most important driver of action 
(Pfeffer, 1994). In consequence, if the strategic intent is formulated to affect strategy 
formation, it will necessarily happen through an exercise of mobilizing political support 
(Mintzberg, 1983). “Interdependence exists whenever one actor does not necessarily control 
all of the conditions necessary for the achievement of an action or for obtaining the desired 
outcome from the action” (Pfeffer and Salanzik, 1978, p. 40). Where different management 
levels act as causal agents, power and influence will operate through interdependencies to 
produce outcomes (Pfeffer, 1994). This paper will clarify how the selection mechanism 
develops validity for organizational strategy in the eyes of organizational members while at 
the same time allowing for strategic change.  
Within multilevel interactions, the strategy-making processes have been described as 
comprising induced and autonomous behaviour (Burgelman, 1983a, 1991, 1996). Induced 
behaviour represents the guiding aspect of strategy. “The induced process concerns initiatives A
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that are within the scope of the organization’s current strategy and build on existing 
organizational learning” (Burgelman, 1991, p. 241). Top management takes a role in which 
“strategic change may take place before it is recognized or acknowledged as such by top 
management” (Burgelman, 1996, p. 209). Although for Burgelman, top management 
behaviour is a major inertial force in the induced part of the strategy process, this study 
allows for induced behaviour to also be a source of renewal, as suggested by Floyd and 
Wooldridge (2000). Top management may set the path for change in advance by 
communicating the strategic intent (Hamel and Prahalad, 1989). The ability of top 
management to formulate a complete strategic plan has been proven to be limited (Bower, 
1970; Burgelman, 1983b; Floyd and Wooldridge, 1992; Noda and Bower, 1996). The view of 
top management setting the strategic intent for the organization portrays a more realistic role 
of strategic direction (Lovas and Ghoshal, 2000). Nevertheless, the rule actually selected by 
Intel had no relation with the strategic intent; hence, the selection mechanism has to be 
broader than the strategic intent.  
Burgelman (1991) reserves the role of autonomous behaviour for initiatives that 
“emerge outside of current strategy and provide the potential for new organizational learning” 
(1991, p. 241). Autonomous processes give grounds for organizational renewal because they 
stem from experimentation beyond existing strategy and they may originate from various 
organizational levels (Burgelman, 1991). For Burgelman, “from the evolutionary point of 
view, only after it has become reasonably certain that the autonomous initiative is viable can 
it legitimately become part of the organizational strategy” (1991, p. 247), which suggests 
selection but does not elaborate on how it actually takes place. However, according to 
Mintzberg and Waters (1985), emergent and deliberate strategies rarely appear separated but 
rather are combined as part of a continuum, which suggests that the autonomous and induced 
behaviours should behave similarly. Besides, by restricting self-renewal to what stems from A
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autonomous behaviour outside the current strategy, Burgelman overlooks the power of 
conscious adaptation (Floyd and Wooldridge, 2000). This study allows for combinations of 
autonomous and induced behaviour to drive strategic initiatives. The role of middle managers 
is crucial in supporting autonomous initiatives arising from operational levels and 
channelling initiatives induced from the top (Canales, 2013). In line with this, the present 
paper considers renewal as a possible outcome of both conscious adaptation and autonomous 
behaviour (Floyd and Wooldridge, 2000). In sum, this paper recognizes that managers at all 
levels in the hierarchy may play a role in strategic renewal and that their behaviour may be 
both purposeful and inadvertent (Mintzberg, 1978; Mintzberg and Lampel, 1999).  
Contesting the Bower–Burgelman process model, Lovas and Ghoshal (2000) offered 
a model of strategy as guided evolution. Their main argument is that autonomous behaviour 
is framed by the firm’s strategic intent operating as an objective function. In consequence, 
under this model all members of the organization select initiatives for input into the firm’s 
strategy, and selection is done by the strategic intent. Gavetti and Rivkin (2007) combine 
evolutionary and positioning theories to develop the notion of behavioural plausibility where 
the appropriateness of following a search strategy will depend on time. The present paper 
considers search for a strategy a given, viewed as the strategic intent, and investigates how 
the strategic intent selects and how such selection feeds back to the validity of the intent. 
Similar to Lovas and Ghoshal (2000), for this paper the strategic intent is exogenous to the 
intra-evolutionary processes, yet it takes form in a top-down fashion. The strategic intent “is 
defined and articulated by top management, and reflects their vision of what is in the best 
interest for the long-term performance of the firm” (Lovas and Ghoshal, 2000, p. 886) . In 
fact, the model of guided evolution centres on the need of Oticon to catch up with 
competition to survive. Although guided evolution shifts the focus away from Burgelman’s 
autonomous behaviour, when it aims at describing the role of top management it does not A
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specify in full what the selection mechanism is or the process responsible for its genesis. 
METHODS 
To study the formation of the selection mechanism, the present study used a single 
case study with strategic initiatives as embedded units of analyses (Yin, 1994). 
Understanding how the selection mechanism originates and becomes valid for organizational 
members lends itself to the use of the case study approach as it explores previously ill-
specified linkages (Lee, 1999). This study uses initiatives embedded in the strategy process of 
the organization, consistent with previous theoretical development in intra-organizational 
evolution (e.g., Lovas and Ghoshal, 2000; Burgelman, 1991) .  
The focus of this paper is on the concepts of interaction between top management and 
lower managerial levels as well as induced and autonomous behaviours apparent in the case 
study. This preliminary notion, derived from the existing literature, allows for iterative 
contrasting of theory with evidence (Yin, 1994), leading towards analytic generalization 
(Corbin and Strauss, 2008) while providing direction in determining what data to collect 
when carrying out theoretical sampling and which analytical methodology to use to elaborate 
the theory (Seale, 1999). 
The case studied, Road Runner, is critical as it allows the elaboration of intra-
organizational evolutionary theory (Yin, 1994). Road Runner resembles previously 
documented cases in terms of complexities (Lee, 1999). First, it is a multibusiness 
organization, yet all business units share a household customer pool. Second, the company 
used well-defined strategic initiatives to promote change. Third, the CEO guided strategy 
formation by means of a new, clearly identified, strategic intent. 
Data Collection 
Data were collected on Road Runner’s strategy-making process and the strategic 
initiatives it produced from three sources: semi-structured interviews, archival documentation A
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and a focus group (see Table I). Data collection took place from 2001 to 2008, with most 
interviews carried out from 2001 to 2003 (see Table II). The rationale for using these 
techniques was to gather archival data on the development of the strategic initiatives first, 
then pool these together with interviewees’ accounts and finally contrast such accounts with 
views from other similar organizations via a focus group. Having different types of evidence 
allowed for triangulation while analysing data (Miles and Huberman, 1994). 
[Insert Tables I and II about here] 
A total of 22 semi-structured interviews were carried out from 2001 to 2008. One set of 
protocol themes was used to inquire about each unit of analysis to ensure reliability (Yin, 
1994, p. 36) . Although ten interviews were carried out using a protocol that focused on 
development of strategic initiatives, twelve were carried out using a different set of questions 
that focused mainly on the strategy process as a whole (see Table I). An indicative list of the 
topics covered during interviews is presented in Table III.  
[Insert Table III about here] 
 Data collection followed a two-stage approach. Interviews conducted at the 
beginning of the study aimed at clarifying the characteristics of the strategy-making process; 
as interviews progressed, the questions turned to the specific development of initiatives. The 
first stage aimed at gaining an understanding of the entire strategy-making process using 
company documents and in-depth interviews. In total, 38 internal company documents were 
collected, 17 referring to the development of the strategic initiatives and 21 on the strategy 
process in general (see Table I). These company documents were the internal forms used for 
the development of the strategic plan, the schedules and lists of participants in each stage of 
the strategic exercise and the actual plan, including strategic lines, objectives, measures, 
responsible executives and timing. The aim was to study the effect that strategic intent setting 
had on the development of strategic initiatives. More specifically, data collection enquired A
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into top management’s interaction with organizational members regarding the diffusion of 
strategic intent and participation in the strategy process. Comparing company documents and 
interview concepts was a way of checking for consistency and verifying the validity of the 
construct (Yin, 1994, p. 34).  
The second stage focused on the evolution of strategic initiatives. Drawing on the 
accounts of interviewees and internal company documents, a narrative of the evolution of 
each strategic initiative was reconstructed. Two key elements, which became instrumental for 
subsequent analyses, were obtained from the evidence on the evolution of strategic 
initiatives: first, the role of participants, and second, the flows of proposed initiatives. A total 
of fourteen strategic initiatives with different characteristics were followed. The duration of 
strategic initiatives ranged from 2 to 7 years, with a median of 2.5 years. Interviews were 
conducted with the head of each working team for each strategic initiative and also with 
executives from the planning department to be able to contrast their views (Berg, 2004). The 
aim, as presented during the interviews, was to identify which factors had shaped the 
evolution of the strategic initiatives from inception to conclusion.  
Data Reduction and Analysis 
The analysis unfolded in two broad phases. First, each initiative was analysed 
individually using narrative accounts, and second, initiatives were compared and contrasted 
using analytical matrices. Transcripts were reviewed as data were collected, which led to 
writing theory memos and discussing emergent concepts with colleagues. To reduce data 
without losing sight of the chain of evidence, a narrative account was written for each 
strategic initiative based on 223 pages of transcribed interviews, archival data and evidence 
from the focus group. The purpose of the narrative account was to uncover the sequence of 
causal links between different stages and highlight the mechanisms employed by the 
organization for the selection of each strategic initiative (Langley, 1999). Though the A
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narratives were rich in meaning, identification of causal links required further analysis and 
comparison between initiatives. Whereas the narratives had been built from interview data, 
the comparison was done using archival data. At least two sources of evidence were used to 
describe the evolution of each strategic initiative (Yin, 1994, p. 69).  
Comparison among initiatives was carried out using a time line and causal matrices. 
The use of such matrices for qualitative data display and analysis followed the guidelines of 
Miles and Huberman (1994). The main sources of archival data were: templates to present 
projects, strategic planning work plan, summary of internal analyses, project descriptions, 
contrast of projects and objectives, description of objectives and a training record of sales 
personnel (archival documents 1, 2, 6, 10, 11, 13 and 14 in Table I). Based on these archival 
documents, in which the organization had recorded all decisions and outcomes across the life 
of the strategic initiatives, data were collated for each initiative in one time-sequential matrix. 
Common features were then identified and patterns for the strategic initiatives analysed, 
iteratively sorting them into homogeneous groups. Through this comparison between 
initiatives and their context within the organization’s strategy-making process, the existence 
of potential constructs was examined.  
Having identified and double-checked the causal links, the specific events that 
explained the progression of each initiative were established from initiation to resource 
allocation. These analyses led to the identification of three types of initiatives: cascade, 
spring and flow. After we identified these three types, it was evident that measured initiatives 
against the strategic intent did not fully explain the selection mechanism. The next analysis 
isolated the effect of the strategic intent with the hope that the rest of the explanation could 
shed light on the selection mechanism.  
ROAD RUNNER AND ITS STRATEGIC INITIATIVES 
 Founded in 1906 as a sports association in Catalonia, Road Runner’s core activities A
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have remained unchanged. It offers its members a number of related services to facilitate the 
daily use of a private vehicle, such as route assistance, car insurance, car checking and 
driving instruction as well as an affinity credit card program. Road Runner’s business is 
similar to other automobile clubs such as the American Automobile Association. Over time, 
the company has expanded the social dimension of its activities and become a key institution 
in Catalonia.  
In 1997, the new CEO was facing a stagnant local market, an excessive number of 
products and services and an under qualified management team. He set out to recruit a new 
top team drawn from multinationals with strategic skills that would be able to relaunch Road 
Runner. While this transformation unfolded, he organized a series of brainstorming sessions 
with a broader group of fifty middle managers. The goal of these sessions was to come up 
with new ideas and assess which products or services would stay and which had to be 
eliminated. New projects emerged as part of these discussions, and the middle managers 
proposing them were put in charge of carrying them out. The CEO realized that engaging 
organizational members in ownership of the development stage of strategy facilitated projects 
and plans in the subsequent implementation phase.  
The CEO conceptualized the challenge faced by Road Runner as a need for 
exponential growth. Most market research showed that the home market was mature, which 
only left growth space in other relatively wealthy regions of Spain. Potential growth was also 
constrained by limited investment funds because Road Runner was a sports association and 
not a publicly held company, and thus could only finance its growth via cash generation and a 
low level of debt. Because of this resource limitation, creativity and inventiveness were 
deemed the most valuable resources. The CEO called on the middle managers to come up 
with and carry out new projects that could drive the effort and deliver the desired growth. A
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Middle managers engaged with the strategic intent of growth. The operations director 
explained in an interview, 
We had reached a moment of apprehension, a bit lost of ideas…then 
what we did was to start up a change program… We put in place an 
ordered method to collect ideas from the organization so that any 
member could freely voice them and at the same time these ideas were 
shared and discussed. 
 
By the year 2000, Road Runner had become a holding of twelve companies, each 
focused on a related business. Its management structure recognized three dimensions: 
business areas (member affiliation, assistance, insurance brokering, travelling, sports and 
other associate services), geographical operations (distribution units in four regions within 
Spain) and functional areas. Also, strong corporate service units were established (e.g., 
corporate development, organization and quality and auditing). Between 1998 and 2004, with 
32 executives in key management positions and a total of 1,560 employees, the Road Runner 
group achieved annual growth rates of 56.64% in turnover and 31.2% in affiliated members. 
This met the CEO’s original strategic intent, and by 2004 Road Runner had become the 
largest insurance broker in Spain in terms of number of car policies issued. This situation 
formed the seed of a major mutation of Road Runner’s core insurance business that would 
later become a fully-fledged insurance company as a strategic alliance. 
The original growth intent required the formation of new strategic initiatives. Such 
initiatives were formulated and developed by separate teams across the organization around 
the year 2000. Work was organized in temporary multidisciplinary project groups, each with 
its own staff and budget. Initiative development in this fashion subsequently became common 
practice within Road Runner. During the period studied, fourteen strategic initiatives were 
developed. Table IV synthesises the data on all initiatives, describing the content of each 
initiative, its originator, the approval process and the decisions regarding resource allocation. A
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An illustrative data example depicts the essence of the approval process and resource 
allocation for each initiative.  
 [Insert Table IV about here] 
PATTERNS ACROSS STRATEGIC INITIATIVES 
Cascade, spring and flow 
The description of the evolution of the fourteen strategic initiatives at Road Runner is 
aimed at elaborating the theory underlying the selection of initiatives. All together, the 
fourteen initiatives composed Road Runner’s strategic efforts over the period studied. Of 
importance was an aspiration long held by organizational members—expand to the rest of 
Spain—as a strategic intent, which compelled them to make the effort to develop it. 
Embedding this aspiration in the strategic intent effectively directed power and influence to 
operate through interdependencies to produce beneficial outcomes. Expanding to the rest of 
Spain gave organizational members the opportunity to showcase their relative pre-eminence 
in their region when compared to central Spain. In turn, this drove them to see the larger 
picture and take on the power to shape Road Runner’s strategic direction. They had an 
emotional attachment to the organization’s expansion, and furthermore, it was perceived as 
feasible. In addition, this intent to expand was instrumental in developing the capabilities 
needed, and the feasibility of the project was tested with a successful pilot project. In 
summary, Road Runner developed a slick operation in all automobile club–related businesses 
in its home region; in the rest of Spain, automobile club services were either substandard or 
non-existent. Expansion filled a gap.  
Although all fourteen initiatives were encouraged by the growth effort, they 
developed in different sequences and achieved different results. The sequence followed from 
inception to completion showed different selection patterns across strategic initiatives. 
Selection operated throughout the life of the strategic initiative and presented three distinct A
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groups of initiatives. Table V shows the analysis that formed these groups and summarizes 
the characteristics of each initiative. 
[Insert Table V about here] 
The first group, termed “cascade,” comprises initiatives for which the CEO provided 
an impetus, which was followed by middle managers’ design and proof of concept, 
dovetailed with acceptance of the initiative by middle management and the front line. The 
decision to allocate resources was made when the initiative was deemed feasible by both top 
and middle managers. Cascade initiatives were undertaken to help achieve the geographic 
expansion, which was in turn the first cascade initiative. As such, they were selected when 
they aligned with the geographic expansion in the first place; however, selection was also 
based on both feasibility of the initiative and its fit with existing capabilities.  
The second group, termed “spring,” is made up of initiatives that were triggered at the 
front line of the business, detected by middle managers who provided their support and 
sought to persuade top management of their strategic importance. These initiatives tended to 
emerge as an unforeseen consequence, either of growth or market conditions, which required 
quick remedial action and often investment. Although selection was based on feasibility and 
the degree of fit with the organization’s capabilities, it was also based on alignment with the 
overall strategic intent.  
The third group, “flow,” represents strategic initiatives that were originated by middle 
managers. These managers sought support from both top management and the operational 
level. In order to pre-empt rejection from the CEO, middle managers purposefully designed 
these initiatives within the scope of the strategic intent. They also stimulated feasibility by 
sourcing required resources and capabilities. When successful, these initiatives gained 
support through a proof of concept activity carried out by the middle managers who had 
promoted them.  A
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Selection processes 
Cascade initiatives  
Cascade initiatives originated at the corporate level and trickled down to be developed 
further. These initiatives tended to align with the strategic intent when they were selected, 
but, perhaps more importantly, they were preceded by pilot projects that generated new 
capabilities and routines at an operational level. Top management seemed to pre-empt 
resistance by carrying out small-scale projects to allow the organization to test drive existing 
routines and capabilities and, if needed, develop new ones. By developing capabilities ex 
ante, top management also achieved buy in from operational levels and enabled the 
subsequent selection of the initiative under consideration. In the words of the CEO regarding 
the geographic expansion initiative (1),  
Since 1998 we’ve been proactively training and preparing sales staff. 
We did not just improvise; the first step was Valencia in 1998, where 
we learned by doing. Next we went to nearby Castellón and Alicante, 
and then to the Balearic Islands. Only after these were settled, we went 
to the bigger regions [such] as Madrid. 
 
This was probably the most important strategic initiative, which involved the whole 
organization in a major growth process. Geographic expansion (Strategic Initiative 1) implied 
a major transformation for the organization and acted as the axis for the expansion expressed 
in the strategic intent. Although Road Runner treated this as an independent individual 
initiative, at the same time and from another viewpoint it was the core of the strategic intent. 
When asked to clarify the difference between geographic expansion as a strategic initiative 
and the core of Road Runner’s strategic intent, the controller explained:  
It is both things, it is our main objective, but at the same type there is a 
team working on how to carry out the expansion. In a way it’s like a 
supra initiative and some of the other initiatives are subordinated to 
this one.  
  
This initiative encapsulated the essence of the strategic intent. Organizational 
members were compelled to make the effort to develop it for two reasons. First, they A
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had an emotional commitment to the organization’s expansion, and second, it was 
perceived as feasible. Such commitment was generated because the CEO was able to 
capture the hidden desire of organizational members to expand to the rest of Spain and 
exploit it by incorporating it into the strategic intent. This wish to expand was 
instrumental in developing the capabilities needed, and the feasibility of the initiative 
was tested with a successful pilot project. From then on, middle managers developed 
strategic initiatives to realize the organization’s full potential. Any additional routines 
and capabilities were transferred or developed as the momentum created by the 
expansion justified extra work and effort. Open interaction between middle and top 
management exploring the feasibility of strategic initiatives was instrumental in helping 
initiatives to take root. 
This process of exploration highlights how selection occurred and the role played by 
either acquired or pre-existing capability; however, it was not only the fit with strategic intent 
that mattered. This idea is reinforced by two strategic initiatives that were ultimately 
deselected: car rental (8) and life insurance (14). Even if these two initiatives were deemed to 
fit with the strategic intent, there was still a need to determine if the organization would be 
able to carry them out. 
In Initiative 8 (a project for long-term car rental), political behaviour had a major effect. 
Middle managers perceived it to be forced from the top and at the same time distant from 
their routine at Road Runner. The political pressure exercised by the CEO was resented 
because it attempted to overrule inherent doubts about feasibility. Though Road Runner’s 
core business was to assist members (customers) with their car needs, middle managers at 
Road Runner did not feel equipped to run a long-term car rental business. Moreover, the 
general view, as explained by the planning director, was that “conventional leasing firms 
would do much better than us.” Negotiations between top and middle managers derailed on A
cc
ep
te
d 
A
rti
cl
e
 This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. 
18 
this issue, and although the initiative remained listed in the books as an on-going project, it 
was never developed. As explained by the planning director,  
…that initiative was doomed from the start because it had nothing to 
do with our business, and on top of that it had been forced by someone 
at the top. We had been so busy with the huge expansion and there was 
no time to waste.  
 
Similarly, the life insurance initiative (14) was seen as not feasible by middle managers. 
At that point in time, Road Runner acted as an agent for car insurance. Even if at face value it 
may have sounded just like a line extension, it emerged that a board member—via a relative 
who was a middle manager—was secretly promoting it. For most of the middle and 
operational levels, it was alien, and they did not know how to develop it further. When added 
to the work pressures of the expansion, the life insurance initiative never evolved. Although 
incorporated into the official strategy by the formal process, middle managers left these two 
initiatives on standby, purposefully ignored, and after some time judged them to be ultimately 
unsuccessful.  
In the cascade group, selection was mostly based on feasibility. Either the existence or 
possibility of acquiring capabilities was necessary. Although fit with the strategic intent was 
deemed important, it was assumed that the CEO would have checked for strategic fit if he 
had originated it. Less successful cascade initiatives lacked a match with needed capabilities; 
these were deselected rather than failed per se. This observation led to our first proposition.  
Proposition 1: Selection is based initially on strategic fit and then on feasibility in 
cascade initiatives.   
 
Spring initiatives 
Spring initiatives normally started at an operational level as a reaction to market 
needs, after which support from middle and top managers would be sought to secure enough 
resources to develop the initiative further. For example, Initiative 9 (travel services for 
corporate customers), was born as an autonomous response by line managers to a market A
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problem. Pre-existing capacity to sell travel services to household customers was utilized to 
serve corporate customers who had not been targeted previously. This autonomous initiative 
was allowed, but as it unfolded it was deemed not to conform to the strategic intent. Also, 
there was little or no interaction or negotiation occurring between top and middle 
management to build up the case for a fit with the strategic intent. Thus, top management did 
not endorse the initiative after the fact. Offering travel services to corporate customers was 
seen as a useful response to a temporary crisis and a way to achieve sales targets. Although it 
provided temporary growth and used existing capabilities, it operated in a market in which 
the company was not equipped to grow. Autonomous initiatives like this may have been 
allowed to occur at Road Runner; yet top management would not let them develop if they 
didn’t fit with the strategic intent as an objective function.  
We simply lost the vacation market, and the branches looked 
elsewhere to sell their services. In the short term, great—they all 
achieved their targets; long term, we will, have to rethink it though. 
(Planning director, interview) 
 
In terms of the selection mechanism, spring initiatives were naturally selected in the 
first place by evaluating them against the current stock routines and capabilities. The next 
step was to assess the cost of acquiring the needed capabilities. Immediately after noticing a 
need, middle managers embarked on designing a solution. In response, a team of four middle 
managers started developing a project that would strengthen the capability of centralised 
operations (11). The founding idea had been to keep the branches as points of sale and not 
burden them with other duties in order to encourage growth. The team perceived that the 
cornerstone of increasing the operational capability of centralised operations (11) was to 
change the human resources policies. In order to produce this change, the team developed a 
project that integrated the areas of salaries, shifts, working hours, location, career planning, 
projection, variable salary and training. These areas were then integrated into a coherent A
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document following a discussion to identify the elements that would increase operational 
capabilities and instil in the front line workers a stronger sense of belonging to Road Runner.  
We found that years of neglect had transformed centralised operations 
services into a catch-all unit; whatever unwanted job there was ended 
up there, and there were no boundaries or filters. (Service Manager, 
interview) 
 
If any unwanted task ended up in centralised operations because it was arguably 
labelled as back office, this team reacted by producing a set of rules or criteria to receive jobs 
and thus avoid being landed with any odd job. The team developed the proposal to set clear 
and consistent boundaries defining what the unit should be involved with. They established 
that the criteria for a task to be developed within centralised operations were homogeneity of 
tasks across the country and the possibility of increased productivity from centralisation. As a 
result of this boundary evaluation process, some of the tasks of the unit were outsourced and 
some transferred to other units.  
In the case of active distribution channels (10), capability building was made easier by 
fortunate circumstances. Though it seemed obvious for the newly arrived sales manager that 
new distribution channels could be introduced and existing ones enhanced, there was an 
unexpected external event that helped. One member of the newly formed team alerted him to 
the fact that a competing insurance company was dismantling its commercial platform. It was 
fairly straightforward to acquire the machines, recruit the operators and have them operating 
for Road Runner in a short time. 
Once the design was laid out, middle managers turned to persuading the CEO. The 
two main elements of the strategic intent, as stated by the CEO, were growth in sales and 
profits via expansion into new markets and an increase in customer loyalty. In order to 
convince the CEO, the middle manager responsible for this project used exactly these 
concepts to build the argument. If centralised operations was left to drift, it would not be able 
to face growing demand, and all the growth effort of the front line units would be hindered by A
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not having a fully functional service.  
In the spring group, selection operated based first on feasibility and second on fit with 
strategic intent. To satisfy market needs, either the existence or the possibility of acquiring 
capabilities fostered such feasibility. Subsequently, the initiative’s champions sought 
approval by persuading middle and top managers of the fit with the strategic intent. Top 
management took a pragmatic approach, allowing persuasion efforts in an attempt to explore 
the value of the initiative. Eventually, negotiations brought these initiatives to light, but they 
also identified when they did not fit with the strategic intent.  
Proposition 2: Selection is based initially on feasibility and then on strategic fit in 
spring initiatives.   
 
Flow initiatives  
Flow initiatives were originated and then designed by middle managers. Once designed and 
assessed for feasibility, the initiatives were presented to the CEO to seek approval and 
allocation of resources. It is important to note that this presentation was not strategy blind; in 
other words, the initiative had been designed to fit with the strategic intent. Because design 
incorporated feasibility as much as fitness assessment, approval by the CEO was considered 
virtually certain. For example, in Initiative 2 (affinity credit card), the strategic fit was 
encapsulated within the development of the initiative, and it originated seamlessly.  
Our MasterCard had a good fit with the strategic purpose of growth 
and customer loyalty. It was natural for the CEO to favour this 
product, so we just went for it.” (Controller interview) 
 
Initiative 7 (road assistance) “killed two bird with the same stone” (MM interview) and it 
originated in an interesting way. The marketing manager, disappointed at the lack of 
resources he had managed to obtain from the CEO, was voicing his disappointment over 
coffee. He had not been able to secure support from the CEO for Initiative 6 (brand 
expansion), an ambitious attempt to communicate the brand in new markets and another flow A
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initiative. One of the managers present was in charge of the fleet of road assistance cars, 
which happened to be bright yellow with the Road Runner logo highly visible but restricted 
to Catalonia. In order to join forces, the manager in charge of assistance offered the 
marketing manager a way to increase the visibility of the brand across the new markets 
targeted. The marketing manager listened carefully and accepted the simple offer: instead of 
spending resources on publicity; they would launch the road assistance product region by 
region across the new target markets. The design of the initiative was straightforward as it 
scaled up the current operations.  
Initiative 13 (Marco Polo) offered a differentiated travel service by establishing 
exclusivity contracts with tour operators. Although this incurred a risk because it meant 
buying larger quantities of travel packages in advance, it was viewed as worthwhile by the 
CEO and designed following fruitful negotiations over savings with tour operators. Initiatives 
3 and 4 (driving academy and paperwork lobby) followed a similar pattern. The responsible 
middle manager formed a team to create a plan to spread the service to the new markets 
where growth was intended. Both initiatives matched the organization’s capabilities and its 
strategic intent, hence it was not problematic to roll out these initiatives and expand them into 
the new target markets 
In the insurance initiatives, the most important of the flow group, Phase I (12) enabled 
Phase II (12). Although it eventually worked out, Road Runner was not equipped to carry it 
out at the beginning. When this situation emerged, it was deemed essential to sustain the 
organization and so judged to fit the strategic intent by the CEO. It was necessary to stretch 
the organization beyond its comfort zone to avoid a potentially significant loss of customer 
base. A problem of scale had developed from significant growth over previous years, and 
insurance companies no longer wanted to bear the full risk of Road Runner’s policies. The 
only option left was to become an insurance underwriter and bear at least part of the risk A
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rather than operate as a mere broker. This incentive was sufficiently great for Road Runner to 
evolve and adopt the strategic initiative.  
The entire organization devoted all its resources to developing the capabilities and 
adapting the routines to move away from a broker’s role, initially becoming an underwriting 
agency (Phase I) and subsequently forming a fully-fledged insurance company (Phase II). 
Operating as a partner of insurance companies demanded a higher commitment and the 
acceptance of higher risks. In addition, the criteria to grant an insurance policy had to be 
more aligned with the expectations of the insurance company. The main capability required 
to develop the new business model was information systems. In close association with the 
insurance companies, the team of middle managers prepared a proposal for the required 
investment and training necessary to substantiate this project. According to Road Runner’s 
managers, although the project went through some painful growing pains associated with 
training the sales force and developing the information systems that would serve as backup, 
the initiative was seen as a success story. Road Runner had been able to face an emergent 
market situation and develop relevant capabilities to react together with the support of the 
CEO, and all in a timely fashion. Phase II was developed as an extension in 2008. Operating 
with the underwriting agency model helped Road Runner further develop its operational 
capabilities, which strengthened its relationship with the insurance companies, positioning it 
for the strategic alliance that materialized in 2008. Throughout the insurance initiatives 
episode, new capabilities were developed based on the pre-existing ones while the CEO 
assessed the strategic fit. The two interrelated elements leveraged each other, allowing Road 
Runner to regenerate and evolve.  
In the flow group, selection operated on the basis of feasibility and on its fit with 
strategic intent in a similar measure. First, the opportunity to develop an initiative was 
identified by one middle manager. Then the design of the initiative was integrated with the A
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strategic intent, thus pre-empting rejection by the CEO. Subsequently, the completion of the 
design facilitated negotiation with the CEO. 
Proposition 3: Selection is based on feasibility and strategic fit by a similar 
measure in flow initiatives.  
 
  
SELECTION MECHANISM 
As the analysis of these strategic initiatives illustrates, selection is a function of 
strategic fit as well as feasibility, albeit in different ways according to the type of initiative. 
However, strategic fit, a match with strategic intent, and feasibility, the possession of 
capabilities, are interconnected. Together they combine into the organizational principle, as 
illustrated in Figure 1. Development of new capabilities expands the possibilities to which the 
organization can aspire, hence affecting the strategic intent and vice versa.  
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
This is clear in the insurance initiative. First, Road Runner was forced to become an 
insurance broker and needed to nurture a new set of capabilities to do so. In consequence, the 
strategic intent had to grow in scope. Once the capabilities had been developed and because 
an expanded strategic intent allowed it, Road Runner embarked on a major transformation 
that diverged from its original organizational purpose and became a fully-fledged insurance 
company. In the words of the CEO, when asked if it was a major change, 
Absolutely, for everyone… now instead of looking just at the revenue line 
they had to look at profit and realize that there was something in between called 
costs. All of our business was changed and we had to develop capacity to manage 
our costs at the same time.  
 
It was sequential and steady learning that enabled Road Runner to face such big 
challenges. The decodification and subsequent codification of capabilities in an incremental 
process of interplay with the environment allowed a controlled drift through which the 
evolution of one strategic initiative (insurance) led to the mutation of the entire organization. 
This process resonates with the notion of “natural drift” stated by Maturana and Mpdozis A
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(2000), whereby selection is a consequence of adaptation to the environment. In this case, 
selection of capabilities and routines drives the selection of an initiative, hence it is the 
underlying conscious process of codification carried out via constructive confrontation 
(Argyris, 2006) that allows an initiative to be selected. This intentional drift notion extends 
the idea of a codified reservoir without which “there exists the possibility of unintentional 
drift in firm capabilities” (Levinthal, 2006, p. 392). 
This paper builds on the notion of labelling such a reservoir as the organizational 
principle, or “what we do” as stated by Road Runner’s organizational members. The selection 
mechanism operates by contrasting such a principle with the specific initiative, using more 
resources in those initiatives that reinforced such a principle. The organizational principle 
appeared as a somewhat ambiguous concept because it was used as if formative 
organizational leaders had authored it. After an initiative was proposed, questions by different 
middle managers revolved around issues like:  
“Is this what we do?”  
“Would this organization do well with such a project?  
“I do not see us in that business.” 
“I think our set of skills could be used more wisely elsewhere.” 
  
In evolutionary terms, this questioning and confrontation probed whether the system 
would continue to work as a whole when parts were added to it. It went beyond the existence 
of capabilities and the fit of the initiative yet included them. It considered whether the 
organization as a whole could or should embark on a specific initiative. In 2001, when Road 
Runner embarked on the underwriting agency model, forming an insurance company fell 
outside the organizational principle. Yet by 2009, the insurance company was fully accepted 
within the principle. The organizational principle actually drifted as new capabilities were 
developed and in turn expanded the scope of the strategic intent. Although the principle was 
presented as a continuation of organizational traits with a halo of permanence, in actual fact it 
was more malleable and flexible despite seeming solid in the short run. The acquisition of A
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new capabilities through the insurance initiative makes the paradoxical nature of this 
organizational principle more evident. Based on this observation, we state the following 
propositions.  
Proposition 3: Feasibility and strategic fit together combine into the 
organizational principle.   
 
Proposition 4: Development of new capabilities enhances the scope of the strategic 
intent, which causes a mutation of the organizational principle.  
 
  
Proposition 5: Enhancing the scope of strategic intent requires development of 
new capabilities, which causes a mutation of the organizational principle.  
 
Road Runner was formed to provide car assistance services to its members in 1906 
when car travel demanded significant support for its operation. This was the original 
organizational principle to which additions had been made through the years every time a 
solution to a problem was discovered. Although today’s principle differs from the initial one, 
it may be perceived as having always been there, and thus legitimizes the goal of long-lasting 
service to its members. Such mutation of the organizational principle occurred through 
purposeful drift from one point to another and was enabled by learning and time but mostly 
via “constructive confrontation” (Argyris, 2006). Describing the dynamic used to question 
the validity of an initiative, the service manager stated, 
 …across our organization everyone has the right to discuss how to 
achieve the objectives. By arguing respectfully but clearly, we get to 
understand and internalize the projects and objectives the company 
wishes to pursue.  
 
Throughout these discussions, necessary capabilities were developed, and current 
routines were tested to allow learning to occur. This learning process in successful initiatives 
was driven by constructive confrontation, which allowed experimentation and ultimately 
facilitated the implementation of the initiative. In evolutionary terms, the ability to reproduce 
routines and develop new capabilities was the object of selection or the vehicle that, in turn, A
cc
ep
te
d 
A
rti
cl
e
 This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. 
27 
allowed for the selection of the initiative (Dawkins, 1982). It was through constructive 
confrontation that the cultural transmission of routines and the creation of capabilities 
occurred. When such transmission and creation happened, the organization was able to take 
on the new initiative fully. Describing creative confrontation, the operations manager 
explained:  
It took a while to learn to really listen and value the viewpoint of 
another person. Everyone has a natural tendency to want to run the 
show because one knows better, but that is not correct. Here we have 
learned to compromise and accept what the others think… we’ve 
grown accustomed to negotiate and build agreements… Now this 
constant negotiation is tiring both physically and mentally, but one has 
to mull over things, allow them to mature, look at all projects from 
every possible viewpoint and develop the ability to influence, of 
course. If it was just my way, one would have to be perfect to get it 
right, and I have not met that person yet.  
 
Middle managers played a pivotal role between operational levels and top 
management, as indicated by Floyd and Wooldridge (2000). Middle managers could 
negotiate with top management, receive proposals brought to them by lower levels and 
provide subsequent impetus to transform them into strategic initiatives. This generated 
significant power and influenced interactions within middle management, but, at the same 
time, the fact that designed initiatives had to be presented to top management for approval 
created a common purpose for middle management to act as a coalition. The behavioural 
nature of the strategic intent coupled with division of labour in designing the specific 
strategic initiative accounted for a circumscribed and channelled exercise of power and 
influence, allowing for coordinated action. In addition, the challenge to develop new 
capabilities presented middle management with a situation whereby they either engaged with 
innovation or risked losing their power base (Pfeffer, 1994). As pointed out by the strategic 
planning manager,  
What we’ve experienced looks like a two-way street. First, all along 
the development of the corporate strategy we go from top to bottom, A
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communicating key messages. Then, from bottom to top we define the 
actions, specific goals and means to address the bigger issues from the 
business unit level. 
 
Top to bottom conveyed strategic fit, and bottom to top conveyed feasibility. 
Together, these two elements determined the degree of fit between the proposed initiative and 
the organizational principle. The organizational principle is the parameter against which 
strategic initiatives were either legitimized or discarded. The process was based on 
negotiations and adjustments between proponents (all organizational members) and the senior 
group as decision makers. The vehicle for these negotiations was constructive confrontation 
(Argyris, 2006), and it allowed persuasion and adjustment to occur. As different management 
levels acted as causal agents, persuasion operated as a vehicle for power and influence 
(Pfeffer, 1994). The selected strategy initiatives, via persuasion and confrontation, structured 
the organizational strategy. Organizational members used this principle as a cultural learned 
solution to a problem (Schein, 2004), whereby previous success reinforced the principle, and 
hence the principle was continuously constructed by the organizational culture. In turn, the 
new elements became part of “what we do” and as such were compared against subsequent 
initiatives. The additions were incorporated into the principle—the new and old together 
retaining the character of the original principle. The principle, as a low level, organization-
specific attribute, contributes to organizational identity (Whetten, 2006), but it is not central, 
enduring and distinctive in itself. It changes with time, and it adapts to allow the organization 
to develop new capabilities and transfer routines that allow the pursuit of novel initiatives. 
Rather than waiting for natural selection, the organization could direct its evolution, making 
commitments endure and evolve incrementally by drifting.  
Although interviewees refer to the organizational principle as “what we do,” it 
embodies a set of complex interactions involving culture and organizational identity to 
construct the justification for an initiative to be selected. Although the principle was used as A
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an enduring and distinguishing feature, it could mutate over time. The ambiguity of the 
organizational principle allowed flexibility so that persuasion and negotiation could occur. 
This paradoxical characteristic allowed the principle to be flexible in the longer term and a 
solid beacon for the short term.  
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
The two-stage selection mechanism presented in this paper adds to the body of 
knowledge of intra-organizational evolution. This paper links elements of Burgelman’s 
autonomous approach with Lovas and Ghoshal’s (2000) guided evolution by theoretically 
elaborating a dual selection mechanism. Such a mechanism, as developed from the case data, 
brings together the strategic intent as part of the guided approach posited by Lovas and 
Ghoshal (2000) with the emergent and autonomous description developed by Burgelman. 
Strategic initiatives, as described here, are selected when they fall within the reach of the 
strategic intent and are feasible but only permanently selected by the organization when they 
show a logic of appropriateness with the organizational principle. When permanently 
selected, some initiatives account for mutation of the whole organization.  
Of importance was the classification of the initiatives studied into three types, 
including the flow category, which is a hybrid of autonomous and induced behaviour. 
Identifying the flow type of initiative is a contribution to the intra-organizational evolution; it 
differs from casting of shadows (Adner and Levinthal, 2008) because it is an exploitation 
initiative rather than one in which its importance is noted after the passage of time. Cascade 
type initiatives are developed from the top down based on the legitimacy of the strategic 
intent rather than being driven by the CEO as in the entrepreneurial m-form (Eisenmann and 
Bower, 2000). Spring initiatives resonate with Burgelman’s autonomous behaviour.  
Comparing the three categories permitted the description of the organizational principle. 
Categorization of the three types is in itself a contribution as it admits more depth and breadth A
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into analysis than a dichotomy.  
In the case of Road Runner presented here, a significant mutation was engendered by 
one flow type initiative related to the insurance broker business. Although it might look as if 
this initiative seamlessly assumed importance, it actually occurred through constructive 
conformation and negotiation of power and influence between top and middle managers as 
they contrasted the organizational principle with the needed routines and capabilities that 
drove Road Runner’s mutation and ultimately the change to its core business. This case can 
be compared with Burgelman’s description of the Intel case, in which the mutation was 
driven by the embedded notion of a “margin per wafer” rule.  
The principle contributes to the organizational identity in as much as it portrays 
cultural understandings that have the potential to be mirrored by others outside the 
organization (Hatch and Schultz, 2002). Yet, even if it can remain taken for granted for 
periods of time, this state can be dismantled whenever learning updates the principle and then 
adopted when the update is over. A stable organizational principle provides a criterion for 
continuity and conformist cultural transmission that favours survival (Simon, 1990). Updates 
in the principle occur via learning effects and positive feedback (Hodgson and Knudsen, 
2010). While normal operations benefit from stability and permanence they also allow for 
learning and updating of the principle. At Intel, production facilities had to be optimized to 
guarantee its technological edge; in the case of Road Runner, car-related services had to be 
provided to customers. By persevering in this “drift,” both cases developed a new base of 
routines and capabilities that enhanced the organizational principle and modified the entire 
selection mechanism to allow the organization to compete in different markets.  
The logic of appropriateness resonates with Burgelman’s (1991)  notion of required 
viability. This model, however, elaborates viability as the cultural understanding of the set of 
capabilities and routines required to carry out an initiative, which composes the A
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organizational principle. The process triggered by the principle is embedded in the selection 
mechanism and is unavoidable. Each time an initiative is considered, inevitably those who 
will execute it will assess it, either as a proposal to be studied or as a fait accompli. In either 
case, only if it goes through the filter of the organizational principle will it be considered a 
viable or permanent part of the strategy. Cultural transmission effects can generate high 
degrees of conformism and cooperation (Henrich, 2004) as culture arises around the learned 
solutions to a problem (Schein, 2004). From that point onwards, the capacity of any initiative 
to produce actual organizational mutation will depend on the organizational members’ ability 
to either leverage existing routines or generate new capabilities. Such ability will be 
determined by the opportunity and the capacity to learn.  
Of importance in this study was the introduction of pilot projects that did not take 
excessive resources or distract from normal operations but allowed time for organizational 
members to learn, which prepared them for further evolution. Learning is at the core of the 
model presented here, answering the call of Argyris (2006). This paper considers the process 
in which top and middle managers create new capabilities as they interact, allowing them to 
carry out selected initiatives because these relate to the organizational principle. Such a 
process is at the core of the selection mechanism, where constructive confrontation is 
essential. The theoretical elaboration presented here recognizes the intrinsic evolutionary 
nature of the development of strategic initiatives. In sum, whether pushed by authority from 
the top or demanded by the environment, if the initiative is not perceived to match the 
organizational principle, it will not progress. If organizational members are actively 
encouraged and allowed to pursue every effort to develop capabilities and transfer routines to 
drive the initiative forward, learning will occur and contribute to the enhancement of the 
organizational principle. In this manner, the notion of an organizational principle as selection 
mechanism triggers organizational learning. From this perspective, Burgelman’s A
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understanding of Intel could be reinterpreted. It could well be that the rule to maximize 
margin was the organizational principle enacted, and as a consequence it provided the 
parameter for selecting initiatives.  
Similarly, in Road Runner’s case, the organizational principle rested on the car-related 
services it provided for its customers. The perception that giving up one of them (insurance) 
could seriously jeopardize the future survival of the whole business made Road Runner react 
promptly and devote every effort to create and leverage vital new capabilities related to 
insurance. External factors lifted aspiration levels relevant to insurance business 
competencies and capabilities, triggering the need for learning (Winter, 2000). These new 
and leveraged capabilities and competencies account for the mutation that occurred in Road 
Runner, and in turn they enhanced the selection scope for subsequent initiatives.  
As in natural evolutionary theory, survival plays a major role in determining the 
learning required to achieve a desired mutation (Hodgson and Knudsen, 2010). In the case of 
Road Runner, when survival was at risk it embarked on redefining its insurance business. 
Similarly, in Lovas and Ghoshal’s (2000) Oticon, after a period of relative stagnation and 
lack of focus, only growth could restore its competitive edge, so it embarked on an 
overarching attempt to recreate the company. As Lovas and Ghoshal explained, Oticon 
attempted to enhance “traditional strengths in engineering and technical solutions, but also 
reflected the need to make the firm more attuned to the specific preferences of the various 
segments of the market” (2000, p. 878). Developing new or leveraging existing capabilities 
was at the core of the change process and led to the intensive development of strategic 
initiatives across the organization.  
 The study reported here is not free from limitations. This paper has reported on 
strategic initiatives in one organization in which all initiatives were part of the same 
overarching effort to grow facilitated by a growing economy. Alignment between initiatives A
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and growth helped to highlight the underpinning selection mechanism, but it obscured 
nuances of the evolution across different initiatives. Future research could add variety by 
selecting a broader scope of initiatives—which could perhaps be opposed to or comprise 
elements of different strategic efforts—to bring to light more nuances in the operation of the 
selection mechanism. It might also consider the effect of recessive or limited-growth 
economic contexts on selection of strategic initiatives. Finally, this paper has relied on 
qualitative data to elaborate testable propositions. A next logical step would be to develop 
constructs from these propositions in order to test them in larger samples.   
The importance of the organizational principle as the selection mechanism presented 
here is that it accounts simultaneously for cultural stability and learning, which transfers into 
renewal at the organizational level. The selection mechanism operates as managers interact in 
creative confrontation, and in turn it encourages learning as new capabilities and 
competencies are developed. Such capability development is what links one stage of 
evolution with another, explaining the very essence of intra-organizational evolution.  
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TABLE I 
Three Sources of Data (Interviews, Focus Group and Archival Data) 
1) Interviews 
a
 
Units of Analysis Total CEO Middle Management 
Strategic Initiatives 10 1 9 
Road Runner’s Strategy 
Process  
12 1 11 
Total  22 2 20 
a
 In all interviews, both units of analysis were discussed because of their semi-structured 
nature; however, this table reports on the main purpose of each interview. 
2) Focus Group
  
November 2003. Three participants from Road Runner and eight participants from five 
similar organizations participated in an afternoon retreat comparing their strategy processes. 
The resulting transcript was 40 pages, single spaced, in 12 point type. 
 
3) Archival Documents  
3.1 17 Archival Documents About Strategic Initiatives  
 N Source Type Description  
 1 Co. document Presentation Templates to present project proposal 
 2 Co. document Presentation Work Plan for 2001 strategy process 
 3 Co. document Presentation Presentation Strategy  
 4 Co. document Presentation Summary of External Analysis  
 5 Co. document Presentation Organizational charts  
 6 Co. document Presentation Summary of Internal Analysis  
 7 Co. document Presentation Strategic Overview  
 8 Co. document Presentation Innovation and Strategy Projects  
 9 Co. document Presentation Strategy meeting  
 10 Co. document Paper Project description  
 11 Co. document Paper Projects—objectives and lines 
 12 Co. document Presentation Projects—objectives and lines 
 13 Co. document Presentation Strategic Lines description 
 14 Public Document  PDF Training strategy for salespersons  
 15 Public Document Paper Annual Reports 2000–2006 
 16 Public Document Paper CEO’s newspaper interview 
 17 Co. document Presentation Process followed in 2003 
3.2 21 Archival Documents about Road Runner’s Strategy Process (Examples) 
Strategic plans, strategy process presentations (96 slides), objective setting systems, 
organizational charts, participants and responsibilities.  
 
Total: 38 archival documents  A
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TABLE II 
List of Informants and Interviews 
 
Job Title 
 Number of 
Interviews 
 
Chronology 
 Chief Executive Officer  2  2001, 03 
 Chief Controller   4  2002, 03, 04, 07 
 Director of Operations and Post-Sales Area  1  2003 
 
Marketing and Corporate Communications 
Director  1 
 
2003 
 Director of the Commercial Area  1  2002 
 Director of the Products and Services Area  1  2002 
 Director of Strategic Planning & Development  7 
 2001, 02, 03, 04, 05,  
06, 08 
 Planning manager  3  2001, 03, 07 
 Planning staff  1  2006 
 Former executive (middle manager)  1  2006 
 Total 22   
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TABLE III 
Protocol Themes 
Interview themes for the general strategy making process 
 Initial focus of strategic plan  
 How did the strategic exercise change for the current plan? Did it mean a 
change in decision-making routines? 
 Time and effort dedicated to meetings and strategic reflection 
 Degree of participation of different organizational levels 
 Reaction of the organization and the participants 
 Use of the strategic plan after the strategic exercise ended. Freedom to make 
changes or bring new initiatives.  
 Interviewee opinion of the degree of acceptance and satisfaction from 
organizational members 
 Interviewee’s view of the importance of strategy in day-to-day activities 
(consensus, coordination, teamwork, goals, autonomy and effectiveness of 
direction) 
 
Interview themes for strategic initiative inquiry 
 
- Background of the interviewee 
- Strategic initiative development viewed from the interviewee perspective 
- Interviewee perspective of autonomous and induced behaviours 
- Interviewee perspective on performance of the project 
- To what extent the interviewee participates in strategy making 
- Agreement on current strategy as interviewees understand it 
- Content of current strategy in all dimensions the interviewee considers 
significant 
- How official strategy affects or influences daily activities as conceived by 
interviewee 
- Participation of the interviewee in the formal part of the strategy-making 
process and critical assessment as viewed from the interviewee perspective 
- Creation of strategic initiatives viewed from the interviewee perspective 
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TABLE IV 
Index of Strategic Initiatives (I) 
Initiative’s 
name 
Content Originator   Approval Process Example of data  Resource Allocation Examples of Data 
     (Sources of data)   (Sources of data) 
Geographic 
Expansion 
 
1 
Overarching or 
“umbrella” project 
comprising a range of 
initiatives to 
implement expansion 
to all major Spanish 
cities targeted as new 
markets  
 
CEO 
(Top 
Manager) 
 Top-down approach. 
After initial impulse from 
the CEO, middle 
managers generated 
specific objectives and 
constituent subprojects 
within the formal 
strategic planning 
process. Objectives and 
projects were both 
presented to the CEO for 
approval.  
“The expansion is associated 
with various other 
initiatives that involve going 
out of Catalonia because we 
needed to grow and we 
needed the volume to 
remain competitive. It was 
not the natural thing to do. 
It was a challenge, but 
everyone was on the same 
page and involved. There 
was probably an emotional 
drive to it from a sense of 
national pride.” (CEO, 
interview)  
 Resources were 
allocated by the CEO, 
initially for pilot 
projects and when 
successful the fully-
fledged project. The 
initial pilot was carried 
out in the nearby region 
of Valencia.  
“Everyone was involved 
because they had learned 
from the pilot we carried 
out before in Valencia. It 
was not just any 
experiment; there was a 
previous test of our 
processes from which we 
had learned. Besides, we 
had been preparing, and in 
the end were equipped 
with a professional 
management team able to 
carry it out.” (CEO, 
interview) 
Affinity  
Credit Card 
 
2 
Use of Affinity Credit, 
which was Road 
Runner’s star product, 
as flagship for the 
expansion to major 
Spanish cities  
 
 
Chief 
Operations 
Officer (Top 
Manager) 
 A team of middle 
managers led by the COO 
designed the deployment 
of the affinity credit card 
in each of the new 
targeted markets.  
“We had been very successful 
with our affinity credit card. It 
was only natural and easy to 
roll it to each new city.” (MM, 
interview) 
 
  The CEO approved a 
marginal addition to 
existing resources. 
Current sales force was 
extended and deployed 
to the new target 
markets, mostly 
learning by doing in the 
field.  
“Placing the cards was 
straightforward, but to 
encourage its usage we had 
to persuade local shops to 
offer discounts and 
promotions. We also had to 
learn how to assess the 
credit profile of new 
members.” (COO interview) 
Driving 
Academy 
 
3 
Use of their successful 
franchise of driving 
academies as a means 
to expand presence in 
major Spanish cities 
Services 
Manager 
(Middle 
Manager) 
 The project was 
presented to the CEO 
within the formal 
strategic planning 
process, where it was 
approved because of the 
reduced investment for a 
relatively high growth 
potential. 
“This is the first contact a young 
driver has with us, and if we 
do it right, she or he will 
remain with us as a regular 
member after passing the 
driving test. We just had to do 
this in the new territories.” 
(MM, interview) 
 The CEO approved 
franchise extension. 
Current sales force was 
used to aim it at the 
new target markets, 
mostly learning by 
doing in the field. 
“This business is very 
fragmented, and it is 
different in every city; we 
had to learn in each one 
what worked and what 
didn’t.” (MM, interview) A
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Index of Strategic Initiatives (II) 
Initiative’s 
name Content Originator  Approval Process Examples  Resource Allocation Examples of Data 
     (Sources of data)   (Sources of data) 
Paperwork 
Lobby 
 
4 
 
 
Offers a third-party 
agent to carry out 
paperwork on behalf of 
the customer to cut 
through bureaucracy.  
 
After Sales 
Manager 
(Middle 
Manager) 
 The project was 
presented to the CEO 
within formal strategic 
planning and approved 
as a logical extension 
into new markets.  
“We started from the 
assumption that we 
wanted to offer the same 
portfolio of products in the 
rest of Spain. This helps 
our members to navigate 
local bureaucracy in car-
related issues, dull if you 
wish, but necessary.” (MM, 
interview) 
 
 Once the CEO gave the go-
ahead, agreements were 
sought and consequently 
contracted with lobby 
companies in each new 
market. 
“In each new territory we 
partnered with a local office 
and offered the service to 
our members with our 
brand. We replicated what 
we already knew in 
Catalonia.” (MM, interview) 
Improve 
Travel 
Offer 
 
5 
Review and develop 
depth and scope of the 
traveling services 
offered to regain 
competiveness. 
CEO  
(Top 
Manager) 
 After the new product 
offering had been 
designed, the team 
presented their 
proposal to the CEO, 
who sanctioned the set 
of ideas with 
enthusiasm. 
“Here we aimed at new 
markets but also at 
developing new and better 
products so we could have 
a more coherent and 
rounded product offering.” 
(TM, interview) 
 
 Endorsed by the CEO, this 
project developed 
relationships with key 
suppliers, trained employees, 
developed a discount policy 
and opened a 24-hour travel 
agency.  
“We’ve always had the 
generalist approach to offer 
a wide range of holiday 
products, and we have been 
great innovators in this 
business. “ (TM, interview)   
Brand 
Positioning 
Expansion 
 
6 
To make the brand 
known and position it to 
the new target markets 
Marketing 
Manager 
(Middle 
Manager) 
 The project was 
presented to the CEO as 
an ambitious marketing 
plan centred on 
promotion and 
communication across 
new markets.  
“Due to the fact that we 
were either unknown or 
known for the wrong 
reasons outside Catalonia, 
creating image was 
necessary if we were 
going to achieve a 
sustainable expansion.” 
(MM, interview) 
 The project was never 
actually carried out as 
proposed. Though it had 
been approved, the resources 
were neither sourced nor 
deployed. This was very 
frustrating for the marketing 
manager. The lack of 
resources forced the 
marketing manager to 
develop innovative ideas that 
would use already available 
resources.  
“We have not gone for the 
mass media as intended 
communication but much 
more targeted efforts that 
we can manage. There was 
just no money to waste on 
big campaigns.” (TM, 
interview) 
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Index of Strategic Initiatives (III) 
Initiative’s 
name Content Originator  Approval Process Examples  Resource Allocation Examples of Data 
     (Sources of data)   (Sources of data) 
Road 
Assistance  
 
7 
Branded mechanic car 
shop: a sporty yellow 
car moves swiftly in 
Spain’s congested 
cities driven by a 
certified mechanic to 
help customers get 
back on the road with 
superb service.  
Road 
Assistance 
Manager 
and 
Marketing 
Manager 
(Middle 
Managers)  
 Comprehensive 
presentation to 
overcome CEO’s 
resistance (risk of 
overemphasis on road 
assistance). Using it as 
beachhead product that 
would promote 
communication in new 
markets proved 
persuasive. 
 
“Road Assistance is one of 
our most iconic services. 
Besides, having the yellow 
cars around a city 
announces that we have 
arrived. “ (MM, interview) 
 Resources were deployed 
incrementally as needed 
to approach each new 
market. The scarcest 
resource was staff with 
mechanic qualifications 
but also able to provide 
excellent quality of 
service.  
“Selecting and training staff 
who are not only mechanics 
but can also provide quality 
of service is the hardest, and 
we need that profile to offer 
a differentiated service, not 
just any old road assistance.” 
(MM, interview) 
Car Rental 
 
8 
Members would pay a 
monthly fee for the 
service of having a car 
available year round, 
everywhere in Europe. 
CEO  
(Top 
Manager) 
 After being introduced by 
the CEO, the idea 
struggled to find an 
owner/champion and it 
stalled. 
“Well, the only goal was to 
draw a plan to sell vehicles 
because it is supposed to 
serve our members’ needs. 
Three years down the line, 
there is nothing, not even a 
plan.” (MM, interview) 
 
 No resources were 
allocated. The initiative is 
kept as an idea, but it 
never develops. It is 
considered a failure. 
“The problem here is that it’s 
peanuts compared to any 
other business we are in, 
even if we had invested the 
effort to learn how to make it 
work.” (MM, interview) 
Corporate 
Travel 
 
9 
Faced with the downturn 
in sales from 9/11, 
Road Runner moves 
away from individual 
travellers to reach for 
SME customers 
(growing more than 
20% in yearly sales in 
2002). 
Front-line 
branch 
sales staff 
 It was carried out without 
asking for permission, 
and it was allowed.  
“Suddenly we have excess 
capacity and the overhead 
is still there, then why not 
sell air and hotel tickets to 
SME customers on the High 
Street while our main 
vacation business 
recovers?” (TM, interview) 
 No additional resources 
were needed, as there 
was excess capacity. 
“We do not mean to carry on 
serving SME customers from 
our branches forever… 
because that isn’t our 
strength, but it helped when 
needed.” (TM, interview) 
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Index of Strategic Initiatives (IV) 
Initiative’s 
name Content Originator  Approval Process Examples  Resource Allocation Examples of Data 
     (Sources of data)   (Sources of data) 
Active 
Distribution 
Channels  
 
10 
Introduce proactive 
channels to reach new 
customers.  
Sales 
Manager 
supported 
by the 
Controller 
(Middle 
Managers) 
 In order to capture new 
markets, the sales 
manager suggested  
pro-active distribution 
channels and sought 
support from the 
controller, his senior.  
“We needed to boost these 
new channels then—such as 
call centres, you know—if we 
were to grow at the rate we 
wanted.” (TM, interview) 
 The controller and sales 
manager persuaded the 
CEO. Resources were 
approved and provided to 
recruit staff and purchase 
needed materials.  
“It developed as a 
consequence of adopting a 
more aggressive commercial 
style where we’ve been 
making a number of small 
changes that together are 
now framed by this project. “ 
(MM, interview) 
Centralised 
Operations 
 
11 
 Low morale and no 
loyalty from operators 
coupled with disregard 
from top management; 
needed restructuring 
of front line services 
Service 
manager 
(Middle 
Managers) 
 Long, difficult process 
to persuade top 
management of the 
strategic importance of 
front line services 
derived from the 
geographic expansion. 
“We had real difficulties in 
recruiting, maintaining and 
training staff, but we were 
desperate for better support 
as the geographic expansion 
gained momentum.” (TM, 
interview) 
 After significant 
convincing, the CEO 
allocated the resources 
needed to fund a project 
integrating salaries, 
working hours, career 
planning. 
“This unit is a coherent one 
now, fully integrated with 
the rest of the business with 
its own targets and 
resources to achieve them.” 
(MM, interview) 
Insurance 
Phase I 
 
12 
As a consequence of 
growth in brokering 
car insurance by 2000, 
Road Runner is forced 
to take a bigger share 
of the risk and become 
an underwriting 
agency.  
Chief 
Operations 
Officer and 
CEO (Top 
Managers) 
 Approved promptly by 
the CEO, it suffered 
growing pains in 
training the sales force 
and developing 
information systems for 
support. 
“We reached a point where we 
had outgrown the agency 
model. We had to come up 
with the model of an 
underwriting agency to be able 
to stay in the insurance 
business.” (TM, interview) 
 Resources were fully 
allocated. The project was 
deemed a success as a 
reaction to changing 
market circumstances. 
“There was no choice here. We 
had to learn and learn quickly 
how to run a new business 
where risk and overall 
profitability were added to 
mere turnover.”  (TM, 
interview) 
Insurance 
Phase II 
 
12 
In 2005, to increase 
revenue levels and 
urged by downstream 
insurers, Road Runner 
become an insurance 
company.  
CEO 
 (Top 
Manager) 
 As a way to increase 
profitability, the CEO 
and board embark on 
creating an insurance 
company, which starts 
operating in 2009. 
The CEO stated that the 
insurance company was born 
because the current broker has 
enough volume and “they 
wanted to take part all through 
the service.” (Archival data, 
2008)  
 The insurance company 
was created as a 51/49 
60MM euro joint venture 
in which it contributes 
with the capabilities 
developed in the previous 
phase and its operating 
routines. 
"The alliance will bring 
innovation, technology and 
experience in distribution from 
our partner, who is a leading 
insurer in France.” (TM, 
archival data) A
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Index of Strategic Initiatives (V) 
Initiative’s 
name Content Originator  Approval Process Examples  Resource Allocation Examples of Data 
     (Sources of data)   (Sources of data) 
Marco Polo 
 
13 
Offer more competitive 
travel packages  
CEO  
(Top 
Manager) 
 New product offering 
coupled with savings 
from bulk purchase 
from suppliers  
“This is an exclusive vacation 
package with high margin but 
some risk as we buy way in 
advance. It sells well across our 
members.” (MM, interview) 
 Important albeit risky for 
buying larger quantities in 
advance, it was viewed as 
worthwhile by the CEO. 
“I wish we had more like this, 
with high margin and we know 
well how to deal with the 
product and the customer.” 
(TM, interview) 
Life 
Insurance 
 
14 
Offer life insurance, 
tapping potential 
synergies from car 
insurance  
  
Service 
manager 
(Middle 
Managers) 
 
 Looked into life 
insurance as suggested 
by a board member but 
thought it was too big a 
risk to pursue. 
“Out of the blue, the service 
manager said why don’t we do 
life insurance also, but it turned 
out to be a red herring; 
someone on the board was 
pushing it.” (MM, interview) 
 It is perceived as an 
imposed and unfeasible 
idea, so no owner takes 
responsibility for the 
project, and no progress is 
made. The initiative is 
deemed a failure. 
 
“Look, if we do not produce car 
insurance, much less are we 
going to produce life insurance; 
that one would just never work.” 
(MM, interview) 
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TABLE V 
Patterns Across Strategic Initiatives 
Strategic 
Initiative  N Plot  Result  Selection Process  
Type: Cascade 
Geographic 
Expansion 
1 CEO sets growth as strategic intent. 
MM generate ideas and projects to 
complete such intent. A pilot used as 
proof of concept.  
Successful pilot run in nearby 
region of Valencia. New 
capabilities and routines 
developed and feasibility tested.  
- CEO impetus 
- Pilot Project tests 
feasibility 
- Acceptance by 
MM 
Improved 
Travel Offer 
 
5 CEO sets growth as strategic intent. 
MM design mass-market products, 
which are supplied by tour operators. 
The new product is distributed via 
normal channels to members and 
other customers.  
- CEO impetus 
- Designed by MM  
- Accepted by MM 
and channels 
Marco Polo 13 CEO generates idea, then checks for 
feasibility with the MM and front line. 
Front line managers develop 
products, which are approved by 
CEO, who allocates resources.  
- CEO impetus  
- Design by front 
line and MM 
- CEO accepts, 
allocates resources 
MM and front line  
Car Rental 8 CEO sets growth as strategic intent and 
proposes a new related business. MM 
design the project. 
The project stalled. - CEO impetus 
- Design by MM 
- Disregarded by 
MM and front line 
Life 
Insurance  
14 CEO sets growth as strategic intent. 
New life insurance product, seen as 
attractive, is designed by MM. 
TM considers new approach too 
risky. MM do not develop it 
further. 
- CEO impetus 
- Designed by MM 
- Disregarded by 
CEO and MM  
Strategic 
Initiative  N Plot Result Selection Process 
Type: Spring 
Corporate 
Travel  
9 Front line tap into a new customer base 
because normal customers dried out. 
MM allow it, enabling front line to 
achieve selling objectives.  
Front line aggressively 
approaches unusual customers 
with MM support. 
- New customers 
targeted by front 
line 
- MM accepted  
- CEO allowed it  
Active 
Distribution 
Channels  
 
10 Sales manager proposes proactive 
distribution channels. Seeks support 
from the controller, who has the ear of 
the CEO.  
New idea is taken on board by 
MM and approved by the CEO, 
who allocates resources to 
develop it.  
- Front line raises 
project of 
proactive 
channels. 
- MM supports 
- CEO accepts  
Centralised 
Operations 
11 MM is alerted by front line of low 
morale, lack of loyalty and employee 
attrition in front line services like 
calling centres. MM persuade the CEO 
of their strategic importance.  
MM redesign and rebuild 
centralised services including 
career plans, salary structure, and 
workload management and 
training programs. CEO allocates 
resources.  
- Front line raises 
issues in 
centralised 
services  
- MM supports and 
persuades CEO  
- CEO accepts  
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Table V (continued) 
Patterns Across Strategic Initiatives 
Strategic 
Initiative  N Plot  Result Selection Process 
Type: Flow 
Affinity 
Credit Card 
2 MM generated idea, then 
persuaded the CEO of the 
match it had with the strategic 
intent. 
CEO agrees, resources are 
allocated and the product 
rolled out in new markets.  
- MM generate idea 
- CEO persuaded 
- Product rolled out in new 
markets 
Driving 
Academy  
3 MM generated idea as an 
important service for new 
markets. Gains support from 
other MM. Together they 
persuaded the CEO.  
CEO agrees, resources are 
allocated and the product 
rolled out in new markets. 
- MM generate idea 
- Coalition of MM to 
persuade CEO 
- Product rolled out via 
franchise  
Paperwork 
Lobby 
4 MM proposed the idea as basic 
service for new markets. CEO 
then persuaded.  
CEO agrees, resources are 
allocated and MM produce the 
project. 
- MM generate idea 
- MM persuaded CEO 
- Product rolled out via 
partners  
Brand 
Positioning 
Expansion 
 
6 MM perceive need for brand 
image to penetrate new 
markets. CEO is not persuaded 
of the need to invest major 
resources in brand image.  
CEO allocates fewer resources 
than requested. MM have to 
make do and produce low 
budget brand image activities.  
- MM generate idea 
- MM cannot persuaded 
CEO 
- Low budget version used 
in new markets 
Insurance 
Phase I 
12 Perceived change in the 
market by MM. CEO 
persuaded of need to change 
from broker to underwriting 
agency.  
Underwriting agency model 
adopted and relevant 
capabilities developed.  
- MM perceive market 
change 
- CEO persuaded  
- New insurance model 
adopted  
Insurance 
Phase II 
12 Perceived major demand from 
the market by MM. CEO 
persuaded by the potential 
increase in revenue to 
becoming a fully-fledged 
insurance company. 
Insurance company developed 
through a strategic alliance; 
underwriting agency model 
abandoned.  
- MM perceive major 
market change 
- CEO persuaded  
- Insurance company 
started  
Road 
Assistance 
7 MM generated idea to expand 
via an already successful 
product and at the same time 
use it as a communication 
vehicle. CEO persuaded by 
“killing two birds” logic. 
Resources allocated, staff 
trained and rolled out to all 
new markets as the 
beachhead Yellow Cars. 
- MM develop idea 
- CEO persuaded  
- Road Assistance deployed 
in new territories 
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FIGURE 1 
Two-Factor Selection Mechanism  
 
  
Three Types of Strategic Initiatives  Organizational Principle  
Spring 
 
 Initiated by front line 
 Front line seeks support of MM and 
CEO. Existing capabilities are used. 
 
 
 
Feasibility 
         Strategic Fit 
 
Cascade 
 
 CEO initiation 
 MM design and proof of concept 
 
 
 
Strategic Fit 
      Feasibility 
 
Flow  
 
 MM initiation 
 MM design: proof of concept and 
strategic fit 
 
 
 
Strategic Fit  
 
Feasibility 
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